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Abstract: 
This article offers the literary and philosophical concept of “profane love”, following the jux-
taposition of Giorgio Agamben’s concept of singular love and his political and poetic project 
of profanation, with the figurative and scattered notions of love found in Roland Barthes 
A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments. The article opens with a critique of the discursive state 
of love today and its relation to politics and power. Following Barthes idea of an obscene 
and Agamben’s notions of profanation and exposure, the article argues that love should be 
thought of as an experience in passivity that happens in the encounter and touch of two 
separate singularities. This process, the article argues, involves the imagination, and as 
such is thought of with regard to political and poetic imagination. The article thus thinks of 
Agamben’s notoriously pessimistic figure of the Homo-Sacer – the abandoned man – in a 
new light. It argues that the lover, as a participant in a radical experience of passivity and 
exposure, can also be thought of as abandoned, offering an affirmative perspective on 
Agamben’s political thought.
Keywords: Love; Literary theory; Agamben, Barthes; Imagination; Post-secular; Homo-Sa-
cer, Poetry.
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Abstract: 
El presente artículo despliega el concepto literario y filosófico de “amor profano” siguien-
do la yuxtaposición, por una parte, del concepto de amor singular de Giorgio Agamben y 
su proyecto político y poético de profanación y, por otra parte, las nociones dispersas y 
figurativas de amor presentes en la obra de Roland Barthes Fragmentos de un discurso 
amoroso. El presente trabajo se abre con una crítica del estado discursivo del amor hoy 
en día y su relación con la política y el poder. Siguiendo la idea barthesiana de lo obsceno 
y las nociones agambenianas de profanación y exposición, el presente artículo considera 
que el amor debería pensarse como una experiencia de la pasividad que sucede en el en-
cuentro y el roce de dos singularidades separadas. Tal y como se defiende en el presente 
trabajo, este proceso se lleva a cabo mediante la imaginación, y por tanto se piensa en 
relación con la imaginación política y poética. El presente artículo concibe por tanto la figura 
célebremente pesimista del homo sacer –el hombre abandonado– en nuevos términos, al 
sostener que el amante, como participante en una experiencia radical de pasividad y expo-
sición, puede pensarse también como un ser abandonado, ofreciendo así una perspectiva 
afirmativa sobre el pensamiento político de Agamben.
Palabras clave: Amor; Teoría literaria; Agamben; Barthes; Imaginación; Postsecular; Homo 
sacer; Poesía.
It is imagination, not the intellect, that is the defining 
principle of the human species.
Giorgio Agamben
In the Hebrew poet Leah Goldberg nameless poem love is presented as an ontological 
experience: we find ourselves in the world, through love:
And will they ever come, days of forgiveness and grace, 
when you’ll walk in the fields, simple wanderer,
and your bare soles will be caressed by the clover, 
or the wheat-stubble will sting your feet, and its sting will be 
sweet?
Or the rainfall will catch you, its downpour pounding
on your shoulders, your breast, your neck, your head. 
And you’ll walk in the wet fields, quiet widening within
like light on the cloud’s rim.
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And you’ll breathe in the scent of the furrow, full and calm, 
and you’ll see the sun in the rain-pool’s golden mirror, 
and all things are simple and alive, you may touch them,
and you are allowed, you are allowed to love.
You’ll walk in the field. Alone, unscorched by the blaze
of the fires, along roads stiffened with blood and terror. 
And true to your heart you’ll be again humble and softened, 
as one of the grass, as one of humankind. 
Western’s love tradition has mostly located love as an experience connected to sight, 
and as such as somewhat unattainable. However here love is “allowed” and as such en-
ables us to touch things. It is an ontological experience that moves from the eye (“you’ll 
see the sun”) to a meeting enabled by touch. Seeing become touching, and humanity is 
accordingly freed: “you are allowed to love”. The world allowed in Hebrew also means 
untied, released, loose and free. This article deals with the idea of love as a form of “untied” 
and abandoned mode of being in the world, as it is revealed in the thought of the Italian 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben when it is juxtaposed with Roland Barthes’ scattered figures 
of love in his A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments. 
This essay thus is concerned with the juxtaposition of two different philosophical and 
poetic discourses of love. The first is the fragmentary and anti-methodical writing of Barthes 
in A Lover’s Discourse, and his concept of obscene and abandoned love; the second is 
the form of “profane love” that appears in the works of Giorgio Agamben, working as the 
cornerstone of his philosophical project. Through Barthes notions, I suggest that a clearer 
and more clear understanding of Agamben’s concept of love, and its connections to poe-
tics and politics, comes to light. 
The juxtaposition of Barthes and Agamben will open up two ventures. The first concerns 
the language of love in our time that is torn between two pitfalls: the sacred and unattai-
nable romantic ethos and the cynical and economic discourse of the social agreement of 
the “relationship”. In the first the proper dwelling place of love is unattainable; in the second, 
propriety is presented as naïve, kitsch-like and even dangerous. Sara Ahmed’s critique 
shows how only an identarian form of love possesses political power today, usually used by 
nationalist and far-right factions, while Eva Illuz and Alain Badiou’s critique of modem love 
shows how it lost its potentiality (for solidarity, enjoyment, and forms of subjectivity that rely 
on alterity) and is discussed as an economic and juridical contract. In this sense, the this 
essay endeavors to offer a re-potentialized love discourse.
The second venture concerns the political horizons of love. In a recent essay called 
“How to Change the Course of Human History” the anarchist anthropologist David Grae-
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ber, alongside archeologist David Wengrow, suggest that the problem of 21st century 
politics is a problem of the imagination: “there seems to be a growing recognition, in revo-
lutionary circles, that freedom, tradition, and the imagination have always, and will always 
be entangled, in ways we do not completely understand” (Graeber and Wengrow). For 
them, as it is for Agamben (and probably many other thinkers today), we need to imagine 
a new form of life for humanity. Agamben directly connects poetics and imagination to a 
new vision of the world: “Rendering inoperative the works of language, the arts, politics, 
and economy, it shows what a human body can do, opens it to a new possible use” 
(Agamben 2015, 93-94).
This poetic stance works against the familiar notions that for both Agamben and Bar-
thes, love cannot be used as an affirmative or effective political tool (Parsley 31-53). I argue 
that the juxtaposition of their thought reveals the affirmative potentiality a concept of love 
as a meeting of imagined singularities. Moreover, as the opening of the pathway towards 
an affirmative political discourse through imaginative and poetic manners. I offer that for 
Agamben and Barthes love is at once the passive process of the encounter with another 
singularity and the affirmative process of poetic imagination. In the meeting of Barthes and 
Agamben I think that the potentiality of a re-invigorated love discourse arises, with all the 
political, theological and poetical implications such a move entails.
I open with a brief engagement with the status of love discourse today, as seen through 
the sociological prism of Eva Illouz, the philosophical lens of Alain Badiou, and the political 
lens of Sarah Ahmed’s critique of love. Then I will move on to a discussion of Barthes’ A Lo-
vers Discourse, to the concept of love in Agamben’s work, and the connections between 
the two. Focusing on Barthes’ discussion on the obscene and Agamben’s notions of pro-
fanation and singularity, I will draw the contours of a concept of love that I will call “pro-
fane”. The essay will conclude with reflections on the connection between profane love and 
questions of literary theory. Because, as Agamben says, paraphrasing Wittgenstein’s sta-
tement that philosophy should be poeticized, “Poetry should really only be philosophized” 
(Agamben 1999b 115). As such, Hebrew poetry, Shakespearean Drama and Platonic prose 
will be used here as gestures that not only explain the thought process of this essay but also 
connect it – hopefully – to the experience of literature and poetry. 
A. Love Has to be Reinvented
Today the attempt to talk about love – in a philosophical love discourse, but even just to 
talk about it publicly – stands at the brink of an abyss; not because it’s an isosteric or 
idiosyncratic experience, but because it is the typical experience of human lives: most 
of us have loved, and all of us have an opinion on love. As philosophy distanced itself 
from the public sphere and the opinions of the crowd now occupy its place. It is almost 
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impossible to talk about love because we already – anyone and everyone – know what 
we feel about it. 
The philosophical engagement with love is difficult for other reasons as well: as Badiou 
puts it, love’s philosophy is torn between two insufficient discursive poles (Badiou 13-26).1 
On the one hand the modern (capitalist), instrumental, and (pseudo) scientific depictions 
of love as a contract, with the economic and juridical implication that this concept holds; 
or even as a biological or psychological process. Love is explained as anything other than 
love: as an economic solution, an answer to loneliness, a reanimation of oedipal conflicts 
or a Biological mechanism. These depictions of love open up an experience in which love’s 
components exist but love itself is lacking. Here we meet the modern “marketplace” of love 
– according to the sociologist Eva Illouz’s – where the romantic encounter takes place in 
the mitigated and safe online dating sites, and the match is predicated by the sameness of 
the potential lovers’ predicates, interests and most of all social status (Illouz 2015, 2017).
Illouz’s essential works on emotional capitalism and the economy of “the marketplace 
of love” clarifies this discursive crisis: the language that we use when we talk about love 
does not refer to love” (Illoiz 2015, 21). Illouz shows how in the modern era love and has 
turned into an economic category: we choose our partners according to the logic of the 
marketplace (18-59). Love is privatized into the accumulation of predicates: the loved one 
is rich, attractive, funny, spontaneous, vegan, etc. Moreover, love has turned into a process 
that involves the “knowledge of the self”. Love discourse turned into a process in which one 
actively knows and shapes himself, in the neo-liberal idea of self-fulfillment. Badiou shows 
that this privatization functions as an infrastructure of a “safe” form of love – manifested 
most prominently in dating sites – where any speech about love can be seen as a romantic 
cliché that does not relate to the “real world” (Badiou 6-7). In the scientific, economic, psy-
chological and self-oriented discourse of love, talking plainly about love without regard to 
“realistic” issues, is considered naïve. 
On the other hand, there is the romantic love discourse. Here the loved one is holy, love 
is promised, and we all have a “second half”. Love is the utopia we aspire to, and as utopias 
go, it is always destined to disappoint. Here we seek to imbue ourselves in our second half 
and to be reborn as a unified couple. This image of love is ancient, as our romantic imagina-
tion about the holiness of the union is represented through Plato and the Song of Songs, to 
Medieval troubadour poetry, Romeo and Juliet and onto modernity, from Goethe’s Werther 
to every other romantic comedy. And, as this story goes, love has two “solutions”: It either 
ends in a tragic death or marriage (the relationship and the end of the love story). Either way, 
it ends before it begins. Love in modern times threatens to sink into the economic abyss 
1  Badiou discussed two slightly different philosophical positions (13). 
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of the “relationship” or to crumble into dementia and melancholy of the tragic loss. This is 
where love and “falling in love” are separated. As such, authentic love does not refer to au-
thentic and “realistic” living, and in the authentic and realistic life, love has no language. One 
can think of our need to separate the “falling in love” or “crush” bit of our love-life, from the 
more mature depiction of love as a relationship, as a manifestation of this tear.
For example, this is commercial sign currently appearing in London’s underground 
trains: “We’re serious, this is the end of dating. This is the end of “disappointing”; of “hope-
less” […] We bring you “like-minded”; “the kindred spirit”. We do it all differently. 35 years of 
decoding the Science of lasting love. 150 carefully selected questions and that one person 
you never thought you’d meet. We take love seriously”. Here, in hellish alchemy economy 
and science and the romantic myth meet: Love has turned into science that unites people 
precisely according to their predicates. 
Moreover, in the background lies psychoanalysis, another discourse in which love is 
revealed as other than love: we are to answer 150 questions that will reveal our interiority, 
and thus enable the algorithm to unite us with potential lovers. But, in a devilish maneuver, 
the commercial also plays on the allure of the romantic myth: we are to meet “our second 
half”, the “one person” that suits us. Love is a secure (probably insured) and scientific pro-
cess that actualizes a romantic and unattainable myth. Economy, psychology, and data 
mining join together to bring forth a love process to end all loves, and as a matter of fact 
single love’s failures. Badiou famously discussed a similar commercial, promising safe love 
(“love without chance”), that for him poses “a threat for love” (5-6). Our love discourse is 
torn between a holy and thus naïve and kitsch-like sphere, and a secular, technological and 
economic – and thus cynical and empty – one. Love is either natural, authentic and almost 
impossible to achieve, or functions in a discourse in which authenticity holds no merit.
The Hebrew poet Arieh Zaks expressed this form of what I will call “secular” love, in his 
poem “A Hard Breakup”:
You became a
Habit




Zaks’ poem secularizes – materially and obscenely – the holy experience of the biblical 
Song of Songs. There, love is “as strong as death” (Song of Songs 8 6), and here, it is com-
pared to substance abuse. Moreover, as Robert Alter shows, the Song of Songs creates 
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an elaborate metaphoric structure, where metaphors create the erotic movement, as the 
lover and the loved one are compared and imagined in a garden of metaphors. A metaphor 
is usually made up of two components: the vehicle that carries one thing and turns it into 
another (the tenor). In the Song of Songs the erotic-metaphoric movement never stops, as 
each tenor is also a vehicle in itself (Alter 185-203). In Zaks’ poem, on the other hand, this 
imaginary and erotic movement is entirely lacking. The loved one is not imagined or meta-
phorized as anything else: it is simply a habit, with the imaging “like” absent (For example 
“Like a lily among thorns is my darling among the young women” Song of Songs 2 2). It is 
the habit that is compared to other daily and material enjoyments. Love here takes the form 
of the notions of the Song of Songs, where love is described as a sickness (“for I am faint 
with love” 2 5) or as a tragic and deadly movement (“As strong as death” 8 6) transforms 
and secularizes them. The secular form of love turns the romantic and sanctified spheres 
of love “on their head”, transforming them into a cliché, and turning love into a physical ex-
perience from which one has to rehabilitated and withdraw from. Love is entirely separated 
from any form of sacredness: it is entirely separate from the image (man, we recall, was 
created in God’s image, and now the two are separated). 
In his Lover’s Discourse Barthes explains the exiled state of love, showing how it’s also 
connected to questions of discourse and power:
The lover’s discourse is today of an extreme solitude. This discourse is spoken, perhaps, 
by thousands of subjects (who knows?), but warranted by no one; it is completely for-
saken by the surrounding languages: ignored, disparaged, or derided by them, severed 
not only from authority but also from the mechanisms of authority (sciences, techniques, 
arts) […]. [This] discourse is thus driven by its own momentum into the backwater of the 
“unreal”, exiled from all gregarity (Barthes 2). 
Barthes’ words – written in 1977 – resound profoundly today. As Steven Unger explains 
“Barthes questions the appropriate ways to write about love at a moment when, from all 
indications, it is a labor of lust, nothing more than sex” (Unger 84), connecting the dots 
between Barthes’ work in the late Seventies, and Illouz and Badiou’s work today. This 
does not mean in any way that people do not love today.2 What I suggest is that there is a 
problem in the gap between love – the thing we all do, in some form or another – and its 
representation in language. And following that, in the relations it creates with our poetic and 
political imagination. It is not surprising then that for Barthes and Badiou the problem of 
love is related to the question of power and politics. For Barthes, the problem of the lover’s 
discourse is its detachment from “mechanisms of authority”; while for Badiou, love is one of 
the ways in which a process of truth can be produced (Badiou 2012, 27-28, 43).
2  See Illouz 2015, 238-239.
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I will not delve into Badiou’s political and ethical theory here; I will only note that the 
philosopher’s perception of love lies in its capacity for opening a form of life that exists 
through difference, what he calls a “two-scene” (Badiou 28). It is also important to say that 
Illuz’s criticism on the state of love today ends in an attempt to reclaim love as an essentially 
social (even socialist) experience, that forces us to live and grow with other people (Illouz 
2015, 246-247).3 Also, following that, that in the “marketplace of love”, these political and 
ethical aspects are negated in favor of a neo-liberal process in which the subject is mostly 
concerned with his gain: and love is seen as just (another) privatized capitalist process. 
Unsurprisingly, the only realm where love still holds a relation to power is identity po-
litics, and mostly in their perverted national and alt-right manifestations. In her book on 
politics and emotions, Sarah Ahmed shows how nationalist and racist political groups base 
their self-definition on love (Ahmed 122-125). This model presents a clear heterosexual 
form of love that is based upon a model of the identity between the lovers, that creates a 
form of idealization: “So the idealization of the loved object can allow the subject to be itself 
in or through what it has” (128). Love has to do not only with identification – the love to the 
self-same as reflected in the other – but also with the question of possession (and land).
Here, the subject tries to unify himself with the loved object – which also represents 
the nation– and in this unification he reinforces himself. This is not a “two-scene” but a 
one-scene where love disguises the recoil from the other (Ahmed 127). Ahmed points out 
to the connection between love phrases such as “I Love Every Jew” /  a prominent figure 
of speech in Israeli right-wing messianic politics – and practices of voting for the candidate 
who “represents me”: looks like me, thinks like me, desires like me and lives where I live. In 
this model, it is not that I “hate the other” but just the simple fact that I love my own kind, 
and the non-queer nature of this love that is based upon identification nullifies the possi-
bilities of being with difference. Love here stands as the ethical and private grounds for 
the appropriating of the political space and turning it into a place where I/us hold political 
power, privileges, and rights. And all of this happens “in the name of love” as a means of 
representation and identification, that also produces a clear and proper form of life that one 
has to identify with. 
Ahmed forms an acute critique fixed upon the failures and falsification of the project 
of identity politics in which the far-right serves as an extreme example to a problem that 
is present in the heart of liberal and multi-cultural politics (Ahmed 130-140). Privately, love 
today holds no power; and when people do speak in the name of love, it forms the basis for 
3  The socialist aspect of Ilouz’s thought’s on love is manifested in a series of articles in the Hebrew newspa-
per Ha’aretz, between the years 2013-2015. See for example “Don’t Be My Valentine: Are Couples Becoming a 
Thing of the Past?”, Ha’retz, 14/2/2013, https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-don-t-be-my-valentine-is-coupledom-
passe-1.5229897. 
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the crisis of representation in politics and liberal democracies that we are witnessing today. 
As Jean Luc Nancy stated in 1992, words that resound profoundly today: “Nevertheless, 
social speech – cultural, political, and the like – seems as impoverished as that of lovers. It 
is at this point that we should revive the question of literature.” (Nancy 37).4
B. Barthes Contours of Love
Barthes’ Lovers Discourse confronts the problem of “talking about love”. The book consists 
of philosophical and poetic fragments that are arranged alphabetically, and do not create 
a clear argument or a stable process: it is an encyclopedia of notions about love. The frag-
ments deal with various phrases from love’s life: gossip, the catastrophe, the tip of the nose. 
The text does not aspire to discover the depth or “meaning” of love and to tell us “what love 
is”, but to present (and then represent) love’s speech act: “Its active principle is not what it 
says but what it articulates” (Barthes 6). As Stephan Heath says, this is not a phycological 
account but a topology: “What is in question is not a psychological but a structural account 
of the lover in place of discourse the ‘place de parole’ that the lover occupies as lover” 
(Heath 101). And Barthes writes that “the argument does not refer to the amorous subject 
and what he is (no one external to this subject, no discourse on love), but to what he says” 
(Barthes 5). This is he calls a “figure” – a linguistic image –a linguistic gesture that occupies 
a particular space.
Steven Unger shows the importance of the image to Barthes’ conception of love. It is 
important to note that this is not merely an image or a word but a bodily gesture. ”Priority of 
the body does not, however, exclude the word, body, and word interacting in what Lacan 
describes as the convergence of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real” (Unger 88). 
Bodies, images, and speech are entangled in the emotive gesture of love, that is, as Unger 
points out, inherently connected to knowledge. “Because Barthes’s practice of semiotics 
acknowledges the emotive structure of cognition” (Unger 85). The linguistic image that 
every one of love’s many experiences creates points to an attempt to rethink the means 
through which knowledge is produced. If we follow Roman Jacobson’s idea that the poetic 
function is focused on the transmission itself (the enunciation) and not on the referent, then 
Barthes’ Lover’s Discourse can be thought of as a philosophical-poetic endeavor of the 
imagination, where the two, philosophy and poetry, coincide in the same gesture (Jacobson 
350-377).
As stated earlier, the book opens with a statement about love’s language dwelling in 
no-man’s land, uprooted from any discursive power, on the limits of philosophy. In the past, 
4  On the impoverished state of world politics example see Agamben “In the Name of What” (2017); see also 
Wendy Brown’s Undoing the Demos. Echoing Walter Benjamin’s resentment towards what he calls “left-wing Mel-
ancholy” Brown connects this crisis of legitimacy, law and politics to the capitalist regime. 
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Barthes says, love had a “method”. For example, in Plato’s “Symposium”:
this conversation is systematic: what the guests try to produce are not proved remar-
ks, accounts of experiences, but a doctrine: for each of them, Eros is a system. Today. 
However, there is no system of love: and the several systems which surround the con-
temporary lover offer him no room (except for an extremely devaluated place): tum as 
he will toward one or another of the received languages, none answers him, except in 
order to tum him away from what he loves. Christian discourse, if it still exists, exhorts 
him to repress and to sublimate. Psychoanalytical discourse (which, at least, describes 
his state) commits him to give up his Image-repertoire as lost. As for Marxist discourse, 
it has nothing to say. If it should occur to me to knock at these doors in order to gain 
recognition somewhere (wherever it might be) for my “madness” (my “truth”). These 
doors close one after the other; and when they are all shut, there rises around me a wall 
of language which oppresses and repulses me – unless I repent and agree to “get rid of 
X” (Barthes 211).
The lover’s language is “exiled from all gregarity [collectivity]” (Barthes 2), but the book 
does not reorganize and make it proper, but leaves it in that abandoned state, against 
closed doors. This process of diss-appropriation involves the deconstruction of the figure 
of authenticity as well. The text does not give love an authentic ethos or origin (or present 
emotions as man’s authentic and non-linguistic experience). Love here is a linguistic and 
imaginary (poetic) process made of quotations. The book is a constellation of quotes and 
paraphrases from different sources – Plato, Nietzsche, Sade, Goethe, Zen wisdom and the 
author’s nameless friends – alongside personal and philosophical interpretations from Bar-
thes. Love is born as a quote, in in-authenticity.5 
As such, text does not re-affirm the somewhat melancholic disposition of the roman-
tic myth –always ending in either marriage or death. I say this against Robert C. Solomon 
claim that Barthes does not discuss love: “Throughout his Discourse he dwells instead 
on the languor, the waiting, the distance, the suffering of love” (Solomon 148). Solomon 
does not simply reject Barthes’ gesture as nihilistic, but he does attempt to answer them 
with a more “optimistic” lover’s discourse (149). I somewhat agree with his claims about 
the problems in the depiction of love as longing, and especially for the call for an affir-
mative concept. However, I argue that juxtaposed against Agamben’s thought, Barthes’ 
love re-appears not as longing and loss but as exposure, a radical experience of passivity 
that offers a meeting with the other. As such the romantic myth of longing serves as the 
profane typology for a language of love as being together. And as Unger shows, the 
text does open up an affirmative mode of love that holds – like hope itself – a tautological 
5  As Catherine Belsey, in her work on love stories in western culture, simply puts it: “I Love you is always a quo-
tation” (Belsey 76).
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nature: “To affirm love is thus to concur-tentatively, that is in the spirit of critical thinking – 
that the subject of love (overdetermined as both discursive voice and humanist topos) is 
perhaps nothing more than (nothing other than) its polymorphous affirmation” (Unger 88). 
Before moving on to Agamben, and the connection between love and profane politics, 
I will locate the philosophical space that A Lover’s Discourse occupies, a space that is also 
inherently exposed. The text implicitly opens up a tension that concerns the impossibility 
of love’s language (perhaps even the problem of philosophy at large): the tension between 
the general and the particular that love always reveals and leaves unresolved. Between his 
own painful or happy memories and experiences depicted in the text, and the philosophical 
endeavor it presents, Barthes points out to the fact that love is always torn. It is the most 
common of feelings and experiences, as we all talk about our love all the time; and at the 
same time, it is a general (philosophical) concept. To talk about love is to be forever torn 
between talking about my love and talking about love. Barthes text attempts to solve this 
tension; or, to be more accurate, to linger in the caesura that opens up between the parti-
cular – the loving person  - and the general – the Idea of love.
C. Agamben’s “Love as-such”
These ideas will become clearer, I argue, through a comparison with Giorgio Agamben’s 
philosophy of love. Agamben approaches love differently than Barthes. While Barthes re-
places talking about love with an in-love discourse (the contours of love), Agamben at-
tempts to philosophically define love (or, it is correct to say that he tries to define the philo-
sophical function of love). One of the more telling discussions of love in his work happens 
in the early essay concerned with Heidegger’s approach to love. Agamben claims that even 
if love appears in Heidegger’s writing only a few select times, in a way it is the basis for the 
German philosopher’s thought: love is the basic movement that opens up being (Dasein) to 
the world (Agamben 1999, 198-199). 
I suggest that love functions in the same manner in Agamben’s thought: it serves as 
the basic means of approach to philosophy, poetics, and politics as it is the basis for the 
potentiality of the imagination, which for Agamben is the “defining principle of the human 
species” (Agamben 2013, 55).6 In the opening of The Coming Community, love appears 
the imaginative tension between the particular and the general, the idea and its representa-
tion in individual cases of human life.
Love is never directed toward this or that property of the loved one (being blond, being 
short, being tender, being lame), but neither does it neglect the properties in favor of an 
6  As Parsley says, Agamben is concerned with an “attempt to retrieve the image from the modern scope regime 
of aesthetics semiotically-governed questions of truthful representation, and Cartesian perspectivism, in order to 
reconnect the image to its place within the imagination that Agamben privileges above the intellect (37).
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insipid generality (universal love): The lover wants the loved one with all of its predicates, 
its being such as it is. The lover desires the as only insofar as it is such-this is the lover’s 
particular fetishism. Thus, whatever singularity (the Lovable) is never the intelligence of 
something, of this or that quality or essence, but only the intelligence of an intelligibility. 
The movement Plato describes as erotic anamnesis is the movement that transports the 
object not toward another thing or another place, but toward its own taking-place-toward 
the Idea (Agamben 2007 3)
Agamben’s love happens in the tension between the particular (blond, tall, gentle) and the 
general (universal love). Here, Agamben turns our pre-prescribed notions of the Platonic 
idea on their head: the idea is not an origin that we represent, and we are not glancing at 
shadows on the wall of a cave. The idea is precisely the thing itself: the singular being –
between the particular and the general – that we love “as such”. Agamben even declares 
that the idea for Plato is the intelligibility of the thing in language (Agamben 1999, 31): not 
as means of communication of knowledge or the referent, but intelligibility as such: the ap-
pearance of language as means without end (Agamben 33). And love is the “bridge” to the 
idea. It is the intelligibility of the thing itself, that is simply the beloved that lies in front of us. 
He is loved not because any of his predicates and not because of universal love:7 the loved 
one is loved in the constellation of his predicates, as such.8  
The thing itself is not an abstract and divine concept but coincides with human lan-
guage as such; the lover is a linguistic image that is intelligible but still resists the represen-
tative mechanisms of communication. She/he is an image without a referent because she/
he is their own referent. The loved one does not represent anything (black/white, rich/poor), 
but only him/herself. He/she appears as a constellation predicates and does not annul them 
(the way a simplistic Marxist or liberal notion on the other will do). He/she is an image that 
represents only itself, and in this way, it is an idea. If we return to Barthes’ concepts, this is 
the typology of the lover’s speech, that lies outside the discursive powers: the idea of love 
is singular and does not create representative relations with other discourses, and for that 
reason lies as a remnant in the middle of the tension between the private and the general. 
The loved one is somehow intelligible, and yet interrupts the means in which we represent 
him/her (black, left wing, immigrant) as it exists in a non-relation with them.
It is important to note that Agamben rejects the notion – that might turn up whenever 
one talks about loving an “image” / that this idea of love is self-referential and thus consists 
7  Agamben works against Badiou’s concept of universal (in Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism). On the 
difference between between Badiou’s universalism and Agamben’s see Prozorov (Prozorov 83).
8  For Agamben, following Walter Benjamin and Aby Warberg’s, the idea is revealed in a constellation: this is 
the profoundly historiosophical element of his work, as historical exigency is key for the appearance and intelli-
gibility of the idea. His work on the paradigm in The Signature of all Things is an attempt to theorize the method 
of the constellation. See also Ilit Ferber Philosophy and Melancholy Benjamin’s early reflections on theater and 
language. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013.
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of auto-affection:
if one recognizes oneself in the image but without also being misrecognized and loved in 
it […] it means no longer being able to love; it means believing that we are the masters 
of our own species and that we coincide with it. If the interval between perception and 
recognition is indefinitely prolonged, the image becomes internalized as a fantasy and 
love falls into psychology (Agamben 2015, 57-58).
Agamben reflects here on the two failed philosophical extremes that I have outlined at the 
beginning of this article: for him, Love is not an encounter with the self-same or a melancho-
lic and endless longing for the unattainable. He clearly states that love is a shared mode of 
living (intimacy) that involves inherent distance and strangeness, that preserves the other’s 
singularity: 
To live in intimacy with a stranger, not in order to draw him closer, or to make him known, 
but rather to keep him strange, remote: unapparent – so unapparent that his name con-
tains him entirely. And, even in discomfort, to be nothing else, day after day, than the 
ever open place, the unwaning light in which that one being, that thing, remains forever 
exposed and sealed off (Agamben 1995, 61).
Love is a meeting (touch, encounter, adventure) of singularities: images, gazes, tongues, and 
bodies, that reveal nothing but the world as such. “These lovers have initiated each other into 
their own lack of mystery as their most intimate secret; they mutually forgive each other and 
expose their vanitas”. (Agamben 2004, 87). I argue that Agamben’s profane ethics are based 
on this form of love. Man, Agamben argues, has no work, vocation or essence: “it is clear that 
if humans were or had to be this or that substance, this or that destiny, no ethical experience 
would be possible-there would be only tasks to be done” (Agamben 2007, 44). I argue that to 
understand the relation between Agamben’s love and its political and poetic implications, we 
must understand his idea of the profane. Agamben’s ethics (of love) rejects both instrumental 
and pragmatic economic existence (and one can easily think here about the manners in which 
politics turned into a pragmatic and technical economy or oikonomia), and religious ethics of 
transcendental meaning. As such, profanation is not secularization:
Secularization is a form of repression. It leaves intact the forces it deals with by simply 
moving them from one place to another. Thus, the political secularization of theological 
concepts (the transcendence of God as a paradigm of sovereign power) does nothing 
but displace the heavenly monarchy onto an earthly monarchy, leaving its power intact. 
Profanation, however, neutralizes what it profanes. Once profaned, that which was una-
vailable and separate loses its aura and is returned to use. Both are political operations: 
the first guarantees the exercise of power by carrying it back to a sacred model; the se-
cond deactivates the apparatuses of power and returns to common use the spaces that 
power had seized (Agamben 2015, 76).
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Profanation preserves sacredness through play (poetics, imagination): “The passage 
from the sacred to the profane can, in fact, also come about by means of an entirely 
inappropriate use (or, rather, reuse) of the sacred: namely, play […] This means that play 
frees and distracts humanity from the sphere of the sacred, without simply abolishing it” 
(Agamben 2015, 75-76). Play must be thought of as the imaginative (poetic) manner that 
love potentializes and returns to common use. Play, love or poetic existence are not a diffe-
rent mode of living, but the potentiality that exists in the world as such. 
These notions will become clearer if we understand that profane potentiality does not 
exist solely in modern or post-modern texts but is inherent to the process of sacredness, as 
free use is to exclusion. In the case of love’s genealogy, a profane event appears (only to be 
rejected) in one of the canonic texts of the love’s philosophy. I return to Plato’s Symposium, 
a text that deals with the relations between theology (Eros is a god, after all), philosophy and 
love. In close quarters, intellectual and political figures of an imagined ancient Athens meet 
to discuss that noble emotion. In this philosophical symposium of love as a method, two 
events of profanations uproot the orderly and proper love discourse. 
The first reminds us that love is something that beings experience: the drunk and Athe-
nian hero Alcibiades Athenian enters the room and retrieves love from general idealizations 
to a particular embodiment. Here we do not encounter gods and myths but a prosaic and 
straightforward narrative of spurned love. Stammering drunkenly, Alcibiades reveals that 
time and again Socrates rejects his wooing and prefers the philosophical dialogue to the 
loving embrace. Philosophy is profaned, but Alcibiades’ speech remains in the ethos of love 
as sacred. He says about Socrates:
his words are like the images of Silenus which open; they are ridiculous when you first 
hear them; he clothes himself in language that is like the skin of the wanton satyr [...] but 
he who opens the bust and sees what is within will find that they are the only words which 
have a meaning in them, and also the most divine, abounding in fair images of virtue, 
and of the widest comprehension, or rather extending to the whole duty of a good and 
honorable man (Plato).
For Alcibiades Socrates’ love discourse only seems as ridicules, but in fact, it is a guise and 
image that holds meaning, duty, and honor. And even though Alcibiades connects the form 
of love – the fair image – with ethics, this apparatus depends upon the sacred dichotomy 
of the proper and the improper. However, his drunken break-in into the philosophical space 
brings forth a further opening of boundaries and limits of this secluded space. 
suddenly a band of revelers entered and spoiled the order of the banquet. Someone who 
was going out having left the door open, they had found their way in, and made them-
selves at home; great confusion ensued, and everyone was compelled to drink large 
quantities of wine (Plato).
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The doors of the sacred spaces of love’s discourse are broken free, as bodies mix with ton-
gues and tongues with bodies. If only for a fleeting moment, in a profane action, Love and 
its language pass over together to the realm of free use. Sacredness is not annulled but is 
freed from the representative mechanisms that chain it: in these few sentences we expe-
rience the possibility of human life and love that exists only as it is exiled from all gregarity 
and every discursive language (power, sciences, knowledge), and for that reason free. It is 
no wonder that the things that were said and done in this abandoned philosophical orgy 
remain out of the text, canon, and law. 
D. Towards an idea of profane love:
This profane trans-historical potentiality takes on a historical figure in Barthes’ Lovers Dis-
course. I suggest that the profane figure of the “obscene” serves for him as the hypothesis 
of any love discourse today: “Example of obscenity: each occasion in this very text that 
the word love is used (the obscenity would cease if we were to say, mockingly, ‘luv’)” 
(Barthes 175); any  discussion of love appears as obscene and improper. “Discredited 
by modern opinion, love’s sentimentality must be assumed by the amorous subject as a 
powerful transgression which leaves him alone and exposed: by a reversal of values, then, 
it is sentimentality which today constitutes love’s obscenity (ibid)”. 
Barthes recognizes the historical status of love in modernity: the lover today is alone 
and exposed. This is a “historical reversal: it is no longer sexuality which is indecent, it 
is the sentimental – censured in the name of what is in fact only another morality” (177). 
Here modern secular thought merely reenacts the old, mostly religious restrictions on 
love. Unsurprisingly Barthes, following George Bataille, connects this discursive struggle 
to questions of sovereignty, human potentiality and the attempt to free it through this 
exposure, “the necessary form of the impossible [love’s philosophy] and the sovereign” 
(176).
Exposed and abandoned love and its (figurative) speech open the modes of profana-
tions. For the unwelcomed “band of revelers” or Goldberg’s “simple wanderer”, profanation 
allows for the free use of the sacred: the grounds of the temple, philosophical speech, and 
political power (if only for a fleeting, imagined moment). Love– exposed and obscene – 
works against modernity as a mode of profanation.
Whatever is anachronic is obscene. As a (modern) divinity, History is repressive, History 
forbids us to be out of time. Of the past we tolerate only the ruin, the monument, kitsch, 
what is amusing: we reduce this past to no more than its signature. The lover’s sentiment 
is old fashioned, but this antiquation cannot even be recuperated as a spectacle: love 
falls outside of interesting time; no historical, polemical meaning can be given to it; it is 
in this that it is obscene (177-178).
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Love today appears only as obscene, a wanton material addiction. But it is in this obscenity 
that the potentiality of profanation appears. 
Amorous obscenity is extreme: nothing can redeem it, bestow upon it the positive value 
of a transgression; the subject’s solitude is timid, stripped of any décor: no Bataille will 
give a style (en ecriture) to that obscenity. The amorous text (scarcely a text at all) con-
sists of little narcissisms, psychological paltriness; it is without grandeur: or its grandeur 
(but who, socially, is present to acknowledge it?) is to be unable to reach any grandeur, 
not even that of  “crass materialism”. It is then the impossible moment when the obsce-
ne can really coincide with affirmation, with the amen, the limit of language (178-179).
The exposed, obscene, abandoned, and wanton love, released from the sacredness of ro-
mantic love and the cynicism of modern pragmatism, is the linguistic moment of affirmation, 
of the amen. Love is singular because it is not actual(ized), because it hinges at the edge 
of representation, forming a non-relation. The grandeur of the lover’s speech is the fact 
that it is non-relatable, not represented and functions outside of the halls of representation 
(sciences, philosophy, politics). This is the singular being that Agamben refers to: a loved 
being, that in her profane state is an image that doesn’t demand identification or represen-
tation, but speech and touch. The loved one, with his predicates, as such, is made out of 
a constellation of small narcissisms that are the idea. It is love’s detachment from power 
– its antiquated being – that opens up now the possibility to use it freely, to talk about love. 
This, I argue, does not mean giving up on love’s sacred elements – the romantic myth, the 
sacredness of love, the joys of sex - and the imaginative potential they possess, but playing 
with them.
Here man’s proper place, the authentic and the sacred, entirely coincides with the 
improper, the inauthentic and the secular; where the amen and the obscene coincide. The 
amen, as Barthes says in the final pages of his book, is not a prayer for a transcendent 
divine force (sovereignty) but a Nietzschean blessing celebrating profane and loving human 
existence as-such: “not to pray any longer! To bless” (Barthes 234). In Agamben’s words:
So be it. In every thing affirm simply the thus […] But thus does not simply mean in this 
or that mode, with those certain properties. “So be it” means “let the thus be.” In other 
words, it means “yes”. […] Seeing something simply in its being-thus-irreparable, but 
not for that reason necessary; thus, but not for that reason contingent- is love (Agamben 
2007, 102-105).
Profane and obscene love – appearing as such, not particular nor general but singular, at 
the caesura between the sacred and the secular – is the improper place where man finds 
his propriety, his potentiality. In this image of love the tension between the general and the 
particular and the proper and the improper, the human and the divine, becomes inoperative.
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Tzachi Zamir’s reading of Shakespeare’s Othello can shed more light on these ideas. Zamir 
claims that Othello’s anger comes from the fact that Desdemona’s deep and unrelenting 
love is, as Zamir says, “a love that cannot be lost”. As such 
Something in this loving saint [Desdemona] makes [Othello’s] personality irrelevant. On 
the most fundamental level, the tragedy is thus about the limitations of erotic bliss. It is 
about the psychological murder implied by the very idea of an erotic bond that trans-
cends action and contingent biography (Zamir 160). 
Zamir points out that Othello’s self-value – the reasons he considers himself worthy of love – 
derives from his actions and utility (159). Against that, Desdemona’s loving gaze penetrates 
through contingent history, actions, and achievements: ”it is a mode of connecting with the 
lover in ways that transcend what he does” (158). Thinking Zamir through Agamben, I argue 
that this loving gaze sees the image of the lover not as a fixed and actualized historical pro-
ject, but the unstable constellation and potentialities – using Agamben’s terms – that form 
the hypothesis (basis) of Othello as a singularity. 
Othello and Desdemona disagree on the meaning of love: for Othello, you should be 
loved for who you actually are, and he mistakes Desdemona’s love for one that negates 
his achievements, actions, and history. He mistakes it for a universal and general love and 
thus is offended by it. However, as Zamir says “Desdemona’s offer is of a deeper level of 
connection, in which she sees as far as his watery, as yet unshaped, source” (159). Her 
vision of the beloved’s image as his “watery state”- as potentiality, basically - brings to mind 
Agamben’s idea of the subject as a vortex: 
We should not conceive of the subject as a substance but as a vortex in the flow of be-
coming. He has no other substance than that of the single being, but, with respect to it, 
he has his own figure, manner, and movement. And it is in this sense that we need to un-
derstand the relation between substance and its modes. Modes are the whirlpools in the 
endless field of substance, which, by collapsing and swirling in itself, is subjectivized, 
becomes aware of itself, suffers and enjoys (Agamben 2017, 61).
Here subjectification is a process that has a singular rhythm (57), but at the same time is 
not individual per se, as the vortex is made of the whole water. This subject is an ongoing 
process that is at once historical, sociological and thus general, but also has a rhythm, 
and therefore it is singular. We do not love the other because of his actions, but in his po-
tential, unfinished state: because of his rhythm. And potentiality, as Agamben shows, is 
not subordinate to actualization, but depends on impotentiality ”potentiality is not a logical 
hypostasis but the mode of existence of a privation” (Agamben 1999, 179). This watery 
mode – unrealized – is an existence of a privation, the having of potentiality, the ability to 
not do. Moreover, even when potentiality is realized, “impotentiality isn’t abolished: on the 
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contrary, it preserves itself as such in actuality” (184). What Desdemona’s gaze sees – what 
love sees – is the potential of the loved one to not-be - defined by his actions, actualiza-
tions, history – but also not be separated from them): to be as-not, potential, and be loved 
as-such, as a vortex. 
E. Impotentiality, Politics and Imagination
Connal Parsley’s considers love in Agamben to be “pure means”, that serves only as a ra-
dical experience of passivity that cannot form political action or relation to the other (Parsley 
44-45). As I have shown, Agamben does indeed think of love as an experience of alterity. 
Against Parsley’s notions, I suggest that this movement also holds political implications. Be-
cause it is here that Agamben’s worn-out figure of the “homo sacer” the man that law does 
not protect nor release but abandoned – his pessimistic paradigm of modernity – gains an 
affirmative meaning (Agamben 1998, 71-75). The Homo Sacer is a person who was sacri-
ficed to the gods but returned to man, and his sacredness is precisely his abandoned and 
profane state. Much alike, exiled from all gregarity and representation, the lover’s discourse 
is sacred precisely because it is abandoned, passive and impotent. I argue that the lover is 
the sacred man that can (speak of) love without secularizing it or reestablishing the kingdom 
of heaven. 
In Remnants of Auschwitz – a notoriously pessimistic text – Agamben also offers a de-
piction of a form of subjectivity that begins with shame: subjectivity is the process in which 
a person serves as a witness to his own de-subjectification, the encounter with the funda-
mental passivity that constructs subjectivity. Being a person means that you are the subject 
of your de-subjectification, existing in the form of a fluid vortex of passivity and activity: 
the fundamental sentiment of being a subject, in the two apparently opposed sense 
of this phrase: to be subjected and to be sovereign. Shame is what is produced in the 
absolute concomitance of subjectification and desubjtectification, self-loss and self-pos-
session, servitude and sovereignty (Agamben 1999, 107).
Agamben connects this form of subjectivity to poetics: for him, poetry is the linguistic pro-
cess of witnessing this process of desubjectification (118-119). The poet,  homo-sacer or 
the lover are figures (or gestures) that express the idea that subjectivity, politics, and poetics 
are inherently connected as an experience of passivity and of exposure.
The same ideas can be said about Barthes notions of love. Eduardo Cadava and 
Paola Cortes-Rocca show that for him, love is an experience that changes the self in the 
presence of the other: “the body he loves is not unlike the music he loves, since both enter 
his own body and, in entering it, prevent it from remaining just ‘his’, even if, as he [Barthes] 
suggests, ‘he’ and his body become a kind of musical organ that ‘plays’ this music from 
somewhere else as if it were emerging from him” (Cadava and Cortes-Rocca 31). However, 
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this encounter is not with the lover itself, but with its image, its gesture. As Barthes writes “In 
the fascinating image, what impresses me (like a sensitized paper) is not the accumulation 
of its details but this or that inflection, What suddenly manages to touch me (ravish me) in 
the other is the voice, the line of the shoulders, the slenderness of the silhouette, the war-
mth of the band, the curve of a smile, etc” (Barthes 191). What interests both Barthes and 
Agamben is the meeting of singularities (without relation, without knowledge) that is opened 
up in the gestures of the other (and of the self).  
It is this exposure to non-knowledge – “Something accommodates itself exactly to my 
desire (about which I know nothing)” – that is the key to a thinking poetics, politics, and love 
as a radical experience in passivity; it is important to note how this stance exactly works 
against the notions of modern love which I discussed earlier, that, as Illouz showed, focus 
on love as a process of self-enlightenment and improvement. Here, love only informs me 
of my non-knowledge and passivity. As Agamben writes: “Lovers go to the limit of the im-
proper in a mad and demonic promiscuity; they dwell in carnality and amorous discourse, 
in forever-new regions of impropriety and facticity, to the point of revealing their essential 
abyss (Agamben 1999, 204)”. 
I offer that love does not only presents the beloved as a singularity “as such”: love 
also offers the lovers space to dwell in, together, as strangers. More importantly, love 
opens up inside the subject this same space. It is not only between subjects but also 
between the subject and himself (Wolfreys 159). Not only do we “learn” that the beloved 
is his idea and his corporality, but that we are (in) this vortex. Language and its dwelling 
place in politics open   this fundamental alterity that can also be called passivity, exposure 
or love. 
I argue for the political implications of such a concept. Firstly, it is a subtle attempt at 
an affirmative language of love and imagination. The critique of Agamben’s work claims that 
his view on contemporary politics is inherently negative. Badiou shows that his political “he-
roes” are desperate, melancholic and impotent (Badiou 558-559).9 These perceptions miss 
the essential aspect of Agamben’s thought, which is in its heart messianic and optimistic 
at its heart (Prozorov 10-16), and I argue that Agamben offers an affirmative philosophy of 
the imagination.
Moreover, Agamben’s “coming community” is not an empty one. As he goes to great 
lengths to display in The Use of Bodies and The Highest Poverty, the horizon of humanity 
is not that of a “man without content”, but a form-of-life for which life and rule coincide. In 
simple terms, Agamben’s rejects the liberal depiction of law as the power that allows an 
empty form of freedom – as long as you don’t do X you are allowed to do anything (thus 
9  See also Prozorov (54).
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basically detaching man from the law) – and calls for the realization of forms-of-life for whom 
there is a deeper meaning to the things they do.
The aporia of this claim is apparent: one cannot call for a multitude of singular forms-
of-life without succumbing to empty generalizations or to dogma. This is why Agamben 
tries to offer imagination and its relation to potentiality as the core of human existence. Ima-
gination is always a linguistic faculty, and language depends upon imagination. So, as the 
loved one is the idea – a singular image – it is love that opens up the realms of imagination, 
potentiality and the new horizons of humanity. If, as Agamben stated recently, the only figure 
we can speak in its name today is language itself, as all other social mechanisms have lost 
their legitimacy (Agamben 2017, 63-71), I offer that love can serve as a philosophical, poetic 
and political paradigm that will enable this form of speech and imagination. 
I suggest that what he offers here is not another “empty” form of universal humanity, 
but the attempt to think of singularities that exist in a union of form and content, law and 
life; albeit always in a process of change, as the subject-lover is always the subject of its 
own de-subjectification. The lover’s blushing gaze offers the paradigm or image for such a 
form-of-life.  The lover is the figure for which passivity and activity, impotentiality and crea-
tion, desire and philosophy and life and poetics coincide. The obscene figure of Barthes’ 
lover can serve as the political hero that Agamben’s thought needs, in its complicated path 
towards affirmative politics.
This leads me to my final suggestion: in love, we attempt to re-insert imagination and 
poetics into the political discourse. It is important to note that even for Ahmed – who whole-
heartedly rejects the idea of thinking poetics through love – the connection between love 
and political imagination remains prominent:
If love does not shape our political visions, it does not mean we should not love the vi-
sions we have. […] We need to be invested in the images of a different kind of world and 
act upon those investments in how we love our loves, and how we live our lives, at the 
same time as we give ourselves up and over to the possibility that we might get it wrong, 
or that the world that we are in might change its shape (Ahmed 141).
Passivity – giving ourselves up to the watery potentialities of the world – is the cipher of a 
love that is, at all time, connected to a vision (image) of the world as such, with all its po-
tentialities. This is what this essay tried to open up, whilst giving itself up to love’s language, 
again and again: to talk “in the name of love”, not in an attempt to recreate some form of 
lost identification, communion or community, but to think of a linguistic and political space 
in which abandonment, passivity, and non-relation are the basis for politics and subjectivity. 
This is – using Jean Luc Nancy’s words – an “inoperative community”, where the relation 
between the different singularities does not demand communion but touch. Love is an ex-
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perience of exposure that can only happen at the limits (of the body, of the subject, of the 
nation); but this is not the “safe” limit of the modern “relationship”, nor the “held” borders of 
the state. As Jean-Luc Nancy says (while quoting George Bataille):
This is why speech – including silence – is not a means of communication but commu-
nication itself, an exposure [...] The speaking mouth does not transmit, does not inform, 
does not effect any bond; it is-perhaps, thought taken at its limit, as with the kiss-the 
beating of a singular site against other singular sites: “I speak, and from then on I am-the 
being in me is outside myself and in myself.” (Nancy 30-31).
Perhaps we can again be informed by Leah Goldberg’s stance: “we are allowed to love”. It 
is love that separates us, and in this untying we are joined together as “one of the grass. 
Touching each other as singularities, intimate but apart: all things are simple and alive, you 
may touch them… as one of humankind. 
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